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Understanding the Economic Consequences of 
Shifting Trends in Population Health
*
 
The public economic burden of shifting trends in population health remains uncertain. 
Sustained increases in obesity, diabetes, and other diseases could reduce life expectancy − 
with a concomitant decrease in the public-sector’s annuity burden − but these savings may 
be offset by worsening functional status, which increases health care spending, reduces 
labor supply, and increases public assistance. Using a microsimulation approach, we quantify 
the competing public-finance consequences of shifting trends in population health for medical 
care costs, labor supply, earnings, wealth, tax revenues, and government expenditures 
(including Social Security and income assistance). Together, the reduction in smoking and 
the rise in obesity have increased net public-sector liabilities by $430bn, or approximately 4% 
of the current debt burden. Larger effects are observed for specific public programs: annual 
spending is 10% higher in the Medicaid program, and 7% higher for Medicare. 
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A.  Introduction 
Over the past century, the US has enjoyed unprecedented improvements in health and 
longevity.  Over the past several decades, however, the skies have begun to darken, as a 
result of rising obesity and diabetes, and worsening functional status among younger 
cohorts (Mokdad et al., 2001; Lakdawalla et al., 2005) .  Much has been made about the 
resulting poor health status of Americans, compared to their counterparts in the rest of the 
developed world (Banks et al., 2006; Michaud et al., 2007).  At the same time, however, 
rates of smoking have declined substantially, presumably to the benefit of overall health.  
The net effect of these large and offsetting trends remains uncertain, as does the future 
health and longevity of Americans.  Meanwhile, the precarious financial position of the 
public sector, along with its mounting annuity and medical cost liabilities, raises the 
policy stakes around the uncertain trends in health and longevity.   
The interplay among health, longevity, individual decision making, and public 
programs is both complex and vitally important to policy.  Therefore, we examine how 
emerging trends in health, along with possible scenarios for health improvement, are 
likely to affect future health, longevity, savings, retirement, and public-sector liabilities 
over the next 50 years.  We base our investigation on the Future Elderly Model (FEM), 
which serves as an engine for modeling the dynamics of population health, longevity, 
medical spending, and labor force participation (Goldman et al., 2005).  The model can 
answer a series of “what-if” questions by forecasting health and economic outcomes in 
the future.  
Our analysis suggests that, while obesity growth and smoking reduction have 
offsetting effects on longevity and health, they both have deleterious effects on the public 
purse.  The key insight is into the timing and duration of mortality and morbidity effects, 
which vary for obesity and smoking.  Increases in obesity reduce life expectancy and 
thus, in principle, save money for the annuity system.  However, they also increase 
morbidity for a number of years before death.  The present value of the increase in 
medical expenditures outweighs the increase in annuity expenditures, which occurs   3 
farther into the future.  On the other side of the ledger, federal revenues rise but fall short 
of financing the additional public expenditures. 
Unfortunately for public budgets, smoking reductions represent a different but 
equally challenging kind of problem.  While reduced smoking lowers both mortality and 
morbidity risk, the morbidity suffered by smokers tends to be compressed in the year or 
two prior to death.  Therefore, the increased burden on the annuity system outweighs this 
relatively small reduction in medical expenditures. Reduced smoking on the other hand 
increases revenues, which finances part of the increased annuity burden. Overall, the net 
effect is an increase in public liabilities.  In sum, both these recent trends in health – 
while apparently very different for private health and welfare – lead to the same troubling 
impact on public finances. 
We use a microsimulation model to estimate the public-finance consequences of 
trends in smoking, obesity, and its related comorbidities.  We first project the likely 
public finance consequences of continuing trends in smoking, obesity, diabetes, and 
hypertension.  Next, we compare this “status quo” projection to one in which all these 
health outcomes are “rolled back” to their 1978 levels, before the recent run-up in obesity 
and the substantial decline in smoking.  We find that, if one were to roll obesity and 
smoking back to their 1978 levels by 2030, public health care spending would fall 
significantly, although this would be partially offset by reductions in tax revenue.  In 
particular, the “roll-backs” would lower annual Medicaid spending by 10%, and annual 
Medicare spending by 7%.  While they also lower Federal payroll and income tax 
collections, even in total, these are only about one-third the absolute size of the effect on 
Medicaid, and one-sixth the effect on Medicare.  Overall, we project these two trends 
together have added approximately 4% to the US national debt. 
The paper is structured as follow. Section B describes current trends in health in 
the U.S. Section C describes the model that is used to describe the long-term economic 
consequences of these trends. Section D uses the model to quantify the impacts of the 
scenarios described above, and Section E discusses the results.    4 
B.  Health Trends in the U.S.  
The United States and other developed countries have experienced large gains in life-
expectancy over the last century. For example, life expectancy at birth increased from 61 
years in 1933 to 78 years in 2004.
2 The first 50 years of the 20th century were marked by 
a strong decline in infectious diseases which greatly decreased mortality rates, 
particularly for the young. In the second half of the century, medical technology has been 
a critical factor behind further improvements in life expectancy, by reducing mortality 
rates among older age groups. But over the last 30 years, chronic illnesses associated with 
more sedentary lifestyles have spread, somewhat mitigating those advances.  These 
trends are particularly pronounced in the United States (Bhattacharya et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, recent declines in the prevalence of smoking have benefited 
public health.  In addition, old-age disability generally receded during the 1980s and 
1990s.  Figure 1 summarizes the recent trends by showing the prevalence of life-time 
smoking, obesity, diabetes, and hypertension over the last 10 years among the elderly 
population. We use data from the National Heath Interview Surveys (NHIS) of 1997 to 
2006 and focus on the population older than 50.
3 
In 1997, the fraction of individuals 50 years of age or older who were obese (BMI 
of 30kg/m
2 or more) was 23.2%. By 2006, this had risen to 31.8%. One study projects 
that if this trend continues, roughly one-half of Americans between the ages of 45 and 64 
will be obese by 2050, which places them at great risk of developing conditions such as 
diabetes, hypertension, heart disease and stroke (Ruhm, 2007). For example, only 5.5% 
of Americans aged 45-64 had Type-2 diabetes in 1980 according to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. Since then, the prevalence of this disease has roughly 
doubled, in a space of less than 25 years (10.2% in 2005).  
The same figure makes clear that we continue to see a reduction in the prevalence 
of smoking, which will lead to less cancer and cardiovascular disease.  As a consequence, 
future overall health trends remain uncertain, and will depend upon the interplay between 
                                                 
2 Based on life tables collected in the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org). 
3 The formulation of some of the questions in the NHIS was different prior to 1997. Further historical 
evidence is published elsewhere (e.g. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).   5 
favorable trends in smoking (and perhaps in elderly disability), and unfavorable trends in 
obesity and related conditions.  At a minimum, the mix of diseases afflicting the elderly 
population is likely to change over the next 20 years. Hence, non-trivial effects on life-
expectancy and disability are likely to occur.   
 
C.  Microsimulation Model of Health and Economic Dynamics 
C.1  Background 
To assess the economic implications of these health trends, one needs a rich 
health and mortality transition model coupled with a model of economic outcomes. Both 
the epidemiological and economic literatures contain complex models of each, but few 
integrate both.  
The current epidemiological literature features several well-known and 
complementary approaches for measuring population health and projecting future disease 
burden and mortality—including models by Manton and co-authors (Manton et al., 
1993), Lee (Lee, 2000), and Hayward (Hayward and Warner, 2005). Across these 
models, there is an underlying trade-off between the complexity of the data required, and 
the broad applicability of the model.  For instance, early life table approaches like those 
of Sullivan (1971) require only age-specific population data as well as corresponding 
disability rates at those same ages; these elements are all present in cross-sectional data. 
However, these straightforward data requirements come at a cost, as the Sullivan method 
appears too insensitive to large changes in disability and mortality, and may thus 
underestimate future trends in population health (Bonneux et al., 1994). Multistate life 
table models and microsimulation models that exploit longitudinal data, however, can 
accommodate richer dynamics than Sullivan’s method and thus provide more flexibility 
in modeling the dynamic interplay between morbidity, disability, and mortality. Such 
dynamic models obtain population health trends as aggregates from individual stochastic 
processes underlying these outcomes. 
On the other hand, current models of economic decisions in old-age tend either to 
ignore or to take a very narrow view of health, which is often reduced to a self-reported   6 
indicator of “good” or “bad” health (Rust and Phelan, 1997; French, 2005). This 
constraint is typically imposed due to computational limitations, rather than by the 
preferences of the analyst.  Dynamic structural models of economic decisions make a 
more detailed treatment of health computationally prohibitive. Microsimulation economic 
models such as the MINT model (Toder et al., 2002) and the CBO’s CBOLT model 
(Oharra et al., 2004) either do not incorporate health or adopt a very narrow definition of 
it. 
We propose a model that considers the dynamic interplay between a large number 
of health outcomes as well as economic outcomes. The model is an extension of the 
Future Elderly Model (FEM) developed at RAND (Goldman et al., 2004). This is a 
reduced-form markovian model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity and correlation 
across outcomes. In that sense, it is well-equipped to analyze the effect of the health 
trends in public financial liabilities, as it allows for complex interactions between multi-
dimensional measures of health and economic outcomes.   
C.2  Functioning of the Dynamic Model 
C.2.1  Overview 
The Future Elderly Model (FEM) was developed to examine health and health care costs 
among the elderly Medicare population (age 65+) (Goldman et al., 2004).  The most 
recent versions now project these outcomes for all Americans aged 50 and older. The 
defining characteristic of the model is the modeling of real rather than synthetic cohorts, 
all of whom are followed at the individual level. This allows for more heterogeneity in 
behavior than would be allowed by a cell-based approach. Also, since the HRS 
interviews both respondent and spouse, we can link records to calculate household-level 
outcomes such as net income and Social Security retirement benefits, which depend on 
the outcomes of both spouses.  The omission of the population younger than age 50 
sacrifices little generality, since the bulk of expenditure on the public programs we 
consider occurs after age 50. However, we may fail to capture behavioral responses 
among the young.  
The model has three core components:   7 
The initial cohort module predicts the financial and health outcomes of new 
cohorts of 50 year-olds.  This module takes in data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) and trends calculated from other sources.  It allows us to “generate” cohorts as the 
simulation proceeds, so that we can measure outcomes for the age 50+ population in any 
given year.  
The transition module calculates the probabilities of transiting across various 
health states and financial outcomes. The module takes as inputs risk factors such as 
smoking, weight, age and education, along with lagged health and financial states.  This 
allows for a great deal of heterogeneity and fairly general feedback effects. The transition 
probabilities are estimated from the longitudinal data in the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS).  
The policy outcomes module aggregates projections about individual-level 
outcomes into policy outcomes such as taxes, medical care costs, pension benefits paid, 
and disability benefits. This component takes account of public and private program rules 
to the extent allowed by the available outcomes. Because we have access to HRS-linked 
restricted data from Social Security records and employer pension plans, we are able to 
realistically model retirement benefit receipt.  
Figure  2 provides a schematic overview of the model.  We start in 2004 with an 
initial population aged 50+ taken from the HRS. We then predict outcomes using our 
estimated transition probabilities. Those who survive make it to the end of that year, at 
which point we calculate policy outcomes for the year. We then move to the following 
year, when a new cohort of 50 year-olds enters. This entrance forms the new age 50+ 
population, which then proceeds through the transition model as before.  This process is 
repeated until we reach the final year of the simulation. 
C.2.2  Initial Cohort Module 
Since we aim to characterize outcomes for the age 50+ population, we need to predict the 
characteristics of the 50 year-old population, in terms of health, demographics and 
economic outcomes.  Unfortunately, the HRS does not include respondents younger than 
age 50; therefore, the characteristics of “future” 50 year-olds must be modeled and 
imputed from data on younger individuals.    8 
First, we estimate trends in the health of 50 year-olds using two methods. We use 
the method described in Goldman, Hurd et al. (2004) to calculate trends in disease 
prevalence from the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS). The trends we estimate 
are relatively close to other independent estimates, as documented in the appendix. For 
outcomes other than disease prevalence, we use existing estimates, all of which are 
documented in the appendix. In Figure 3, the dotted lines represent our baseline 
projection for smoking and obesity. 
Second, we use the 50 year-old HRS respondents from 2004 as a template for 
future cohorts of 50 year-olds.  We “adjust” their health to match projected prevalence 
levels, using the trends estimated in the first step.  For example, if obesity is projected to 
go up in 2020, we increase the rate of obesity within the cohort of 50 year-olds, by 
“reassigning” enough non-obese individuals to obesity status.  Since obesity is correlated 
with other outcomes such as hypertension and diabetes, we reassign obesity status so that 
those at greatest risk are more likely to acquire it.   
The reassignment is governed by a latent health model with correlated 
unobservables.  An individual’s disease status is a function of the mean population 
probability of the disease, along with a random error term.  For an individual, the error 
terms are correlated across diseases.  This builds in the possibility that, for instance, the 
occurrence of diabetes and hypertension are correlated.  We jointly estimate the 
population means and the covariance structure of the error terms by maximum simulated 
likelihood (more details appear in the technical appendix). Table 2 lists all the outcomes 
that we model. There are seven binary outcomes:  hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, 
fair or poor self-reported health, labor force participation, insurance status and positive 
wealth. (The inclusion of this last indicator is necessary because of the observed spike in 
the distribution of net wealth at zero in the HRS.) There are three ordered outcomes:  
BMI status, smoking status and functional status, defined as it is in the transition model. 
Finally, there are five continuous outcomes:  average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), 
the number of quarters of coverage; earnings, financial wealth, and defined contribution 
(DC) wealth. We also model respondents’ pension plan characteristics:  whether they 
have a DB or DC plan on the current job; the earliest age at which they are eligible; and 
the normal retirement age. We group the latter around peaks in the empirical distribution.   9 
The most common early retirement age is 55, and the most common normal retirement 
age is 62. Finally, each of these outcomes depends on fixed characteristics such as race, 
education, gender and marital status. We also consider cancer, lung disease and stroke as 
fixed covariates, because their prevalence is very low in this population (age 50-53). 
Estimates are presented in the appendix. 
Finally, the size of the entering cohort is adjusted to reflect population projections 
from Census by gender and race. We also adjust the size of the initial new cohort in 2004 
to Census estimates by gender, race and ethnicity. 
C.2.3  Transition Model 
The transition model tracks movement among states as a function of risk and 
demographic factors.  The technical appendix provides details on the parametric 
structure, estimation, and validation of the model.  Here we enumerate and discuss all the 
key inputs and outputs of the model, and how they are measured.   
The data come from the 1992 to 2004 biennial waves of the HRS. We consider 
both health and economic outcomes, all of which are listed in Table 1.  The table lists 
several groups of variables:  diseases, risk factors, functional status, labor force and 
benefit status, financial resources, nursing home residence, and death.  At a particular 
point in an individual’s life, the model takes as inputs the individual’s risk factors, along 
with her lagged disease status, functional status, labor force and benefit status, financial 
resources, and nursing home status.  The outputs are current disease status, functional 
status, labor force and benefit status, financial resources, and nursing home status.  More 
detail on variable measurement is presented below. 
Transition rates are allowed to differ across demographic and economic groups. In 
particular, we allow differences by gender, race and ethnicity, education, and marital 
status. Transition equations are estimated on 7 waves of the HRS.  To assess the fit, we 
use estimated transition probabilities to simulate what 1992 HRS respondents would look 
like in 2004. We then compare these to actual outcomes. We use half the sample for 
estimation and the other half for simulation. In general, the model fits the data quite well, 
with a close correspondence between predicted and actual outcomes in most areas, 
including labor supply, claiming behavior, functional status, and diseases. Complete   10 
results can be found in Table A.9 of the technical appendix. We present more validation 
results later.  
Measurement of Variables 
The list of diseases includes the most prevalent conditions in the HRS survey:  
hypertension, stroke, heart disease, lung disease, diabetes and cancer.  An individual’s 
disease status is estimated using the responses to questions of the form: "Has a doctor 
ever told you that you had…."  Consistent with the chronic nature of these illnesses, we 
assume there is no chance of recovery and model the time until diagnosis (after age 50).  
Second, we consider risk factors, focusing particularly on smoking and obesity. 
We model transitions across three “obesity” states: not obese (BMI<25), overweight (25-
30) and obese (BMI>30). This information is derived from self-reports on weight and 
height.
4 For smoking, we model whether the respondent:  has never smoked, has ever 
smoked but quit, or is still smoking at the time of the interview.  
Third, we consider measures of functional status commonly known as ADL 
(activities of daily living) limitations and IADL (instrumental activities of daily living) 
limitations. These are counts of positive answers to questions (5 for ADL limitations and 
7 for IADL limitations) such as whether the respondent has trouble walking, getting out 
of bed, dressing, etc.  IADL’s are typically less severe impairments than ADL’s.  We 
measure functional status by classifying respondents into the following categories:  no 
IADL or ADL limitations, 1-2 IADL limitations but no ADL limitations, 1-2 ADL 
limitations, or 3+ ADL limitations.  This classification scheme yields four mutually 
exclusive categories (based on the data). These are not assumed to be absorbing states in 
that we allow for recovery. 
Next, we add labor force and benefit receipt outcomes.  (We express all monetary 
units in terms of 2004 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.)  First, we track whether 
someone works for pay (any positive hours), and we track earnings on the main job. We 
also track whether the respondent has employer-based health insurance, or derives 
coverage from other sources (apart from Medicare). We do this for the population 
younger than age 65. After age 65, nearly all respondents have insurance through 
                                                 
4 We do not attempt to correct self-reports for measurement error (notoriously underreporting).    11 
Medicare.  An individual can derive coverage through his employer, the employer of 
his/her spouse, a private insurer, or a government assistance program such as Medicaid 
(if disabled). We also record whether someone has a pension on his job, and whether this 
is a defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) type. If the respondent reports a 
DC pension, we also consider the self-reported account balance as another dependent 
variable.  If the respondent reports a DB pension, we record the earliest age at which the 
pension can be claimed, as well as the number of years on the job and the normal 
retirement age on that plan. We also construct a variable recording whether someone is 
claiming a DB pension on the current job (quitting a job with a DB pension). Hence, we 
have 2 binary state variables (DC and DB entitlement) and one continuous state-variable 
(DC account balance) to take account of private pensions.  
We model Social Security retirement benefit receipt using the self-reported age at 
which benefits were first claimed.  Since we have access to earnings records for 
respondents in the HRS, we also determine who is eligible upon reaching age 62 using 
quarters of coverage. We construct the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for 
the initial interview and update the AIME in the simulation using a simplified rule as in 
French (2005).
5  The AIME is the basis for computing benefits. We also model disability 
insurance (DI) benefit receipt and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) using self-reports 
from the HRS. When reporting SSI figures however, we use a measurement error 
correction model estimated from merging self-reported with administrative data from 
SSA to correct for underreporting (see Technical Appendix for details).  
We then add measures of financial resources.  We construct a measure of net 
financial wealth using self-reports from the HRS and imputations performed by RAND 
(Hurd et al., 1998). Net financial wealth is defined as the value of financial assets 
(checking, savings, stocks, IRAs, Certificate deposits, bonds) plus the value of real assets 
(primary house, other real estate, other real assets) minus all debt (mortgage, home loans, 
credit cards, etc).  We also track earnings, and whether wealth is positive.  To account for 
the skewness of the wealth and earnings distribution, we use the generalized inverse 
                                                 
5 We estimate a regression function of next period’s AIME as a function of baseline AIME and earnings. 
We allow coefficients to be age specific and consider a second-order approximation. Estimates available 
upon request.   12 
hyperbolic sine transformation (MacKinnon and Magee, 1990). For both wealth and 
earnings, we censor observations above the 99
th percentile in 2004.  
Finally, we track nursing home residence, and mortality.  The HRS initially did 
not sample from the nursing home population. However, it does follow respondents into 
nursing homes and also records transition back to independent or assisted living outside 
nursing homes.  Mortality is recorded in exit interviews in the HRS. Mortality hazards 
derived from the HRS correspond closely with life-table probabilities (Adams et al., 
2003; Michaud et al., 2006). 
Model Restrictions 
We make several restrictions on the transition risks permitted in the model.  First, 
we only allow feedback from diseases where clinical research supports such a link. For 
example, we allow hypertensive patients to have higher risk of heart disease incidence, 
but we do not allow hypertensive patients to have higher risk of cancer. These clinical 
restrictions are documented in the technical appendix and elsewhere (Goldman et al., 
2004). 
Another important restriction we impose is that economic outcomes do not have 
feedback effects on health. This is consistent with the findings from previous studies 
(Adams et al., 2003). SES does not appear to have a causal effect on health outcomes in 
this age range.  The correlation between SES and health appears to be generated by 
feedback effects from health to economic status, most notably through the effect of health 
shocks on labor supply and medical spending.  Also playing a role are predetermined 
(earlier) events or common factors (genetics, etc) that induce a non-causal correlation 
between SES and health (Michaud and van Soest, 2008).  These two factors are 
accounted for in the estimation. 
C.2.4  Policy Outcomes 
The model simulates a number of relevant health and economic outcomes for individuals.  
First, we consider a set of health outcomes such as life-expectancy and healthy life 
expectancy (no ADL) at age 50 and medical expenditures. Average medical expenditures 
by disease and demographic group are calculated from two sources. For those younger 
than age 65, we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and include in 
medical expenditures the respondents’ medical care costs and the cost of drugs. For those   13 
above age 65, we use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The MEPS is 
known to under-predict expenditures compared to National Health Expenditure Accounts 
(NHEA) (Sing et al., 2006). We also find that the MCBS under-predicts expenditures 
from the NHEA. Without adjustment, we seem to under predict payments (by $59 billion 
for Medicare and $38 billion for Medicaid). Our cost estimates are based on average 
expenditures in the Medical Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and total costs in the 
MCBS are also lower than in the NHEA.  The MCBS is known to undercount medical 
spending by both the Congressional Budget Office and the CMS (Christensen and 
Wagner, 2000).
6  Hence, we adjust those numbers to match the NHEA. More detail can 
be found in the Appendix (section 5, p. 12).  
In addition to the individual outcomes, the model predicts revenues and 
expenditures by the Federal Government, for the age 50+ population.  As part of the 
predicted medical expenditures, we also predict expenditures by source, including those 
by Medicare and Medicaid.  Next, we compute Social Security retirement benefits for 
those predicted to receive such benefits. Since we have the AIME of both respondent and 
spouse, we can precisely estimate the distribution of retirement benefits. We account for 
spouse and survivor benefits. We also compute disability insurance (DI) benefits and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). We compute DB pension income from average 
pension payments by tenure, last earnings and early and normal retirement ages using 
Pension Plan characteristics reported by Employers of HRS respondents. Using all these 
income flows, for the respondent and the spouse (if present), we compute net household 
income where taxes include Federal, State, City income taxes as well as the Social 
Security taxes (OASDI and Medicare). More detail is provided in the appendix. 
C.2.5  Simulation Methods 
The simulation starts with the existing age 50+ population in the 2004 wave of the HRS. 
The microsimulation is stochastic, meaning that transitions are randomly drawn from the 
joint distributions estimated from the HRS. There are two stochastic elements in the 
model: the simulation of new cohorts and the simulation of transitions. To generate new 
cohorts, we make use of the estimated joint distribution and use random draws from the 
                                                 
6The Congressional Budget Office, for example, inflated MCBS prescription drug spending by 15 percent to 
produce its official forecast of the cost of Part D.    14 
correlated errors to generate a new cohort. Second, for each respondent in a given year, 
we calculate transition probabilities. We then draw random numbers to attribute new 
outcomes. This process is repeated a number of times to ensure independence from any 
particular sequence of random numbers. We average over 10 replications.  
D.  Scenarios and Results 
To estimate the impact of recent trends in obesity and smoking on public-sector assets 
and liabilities, we simulate the counterfactual scenario in which both obesity and 
smoking are gradually returned – by 2030 -- to their 1978 levels.  We then study trends in 
public-sector spending and revenues subsequent to this return to baseline.   
D.1  Scenarios 
The dramatic rise in obesity and fall in smoking began approximately in the late 1970s.  
As a result, we simulate the impact of gradually rolling back obesity and smoking to their 
1978 levels.  In the simulation, incoming cohorts exhibit gradually lower obesity and 
higher smoking rates, until 1978 levels are finally reached in the year 2030.  The rates of 
changes in prevalence of obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and smoking among aged 47-56 
from 1978 to 2004 are shown in Appendix table A.4. Specifically, we consider: 
1.  Obesity Scenario: Among 51-52 year-olds, the prevalence of obesity, 
hypertension and diabetes rolled back to 1978 levels (obesity was 13.9%) by 
2030 and then kept constant until 2050. 
2.  Smoking Scenario: Among 51-52 year-olds, prevalence of current smokers rolled 
back to 1978 level (37.5%) and then kept constant until 2050. 
Figure 3 presents the prevalence rates we use under different scenarios for the incoming 
cohorts. Each of these scenarios is compared to our “baseline scenario.”  This uses the 
model to project future trends, assuming that current trends are allowed to persist.  We 
document these baseline trends in the Appendix.  
  Our analysis demonstrates that the continuing rise in obesity and continuing 
reduction in smoking both lead to greater public spending.  In the case of obesity, while 
sicker cohorts cost less in terms of annuity obligations, those cost reductions occur 
strictly at the end of life.  Moreover, higher health care costs due to greater morbidity   15 
start to accrue at earlier ages.  On the other hand, while the reduction in smoking 
improves morbidity, it does so only in the years immediately preceding death.  The 
relatively short window of reduced morbidity is insufficient to offset the annuity costs of 
substantially greater longevity due to smoking reduction.   
D.2  Results 
We first discuss results in the baseline scenario and compare our estimates with published 
government projections to gauge validity. We then compare the results from the baseline 
with those from the two “roll back” scenarios. 
D.2.1  Baseline Estimates and Comparability with Administrative Data 
In Table 3, we present detailed results for the population aged 50+ in 2004, 2030 and 
2050.  Given current trends, we project the size of the population aged 50+ will increase 
by nearly 75% from 80.7 million in 2004 to 144 million in 2050. This result, shown in 
Table 3, largely reflects the effect of population aging.  Reinforcing these effects is the 
increase in life expectancy from age 50, which is projected to move from 30.9 years in 
2004, to 31.6 years in 2050 (Figure 4). However, Figure 4 also documents an expected 
decline in the number of years of healthy living (without disability) from 25.2 to 24.75 
for this group. In other words, the increase in life expectancy comes entirely from longer 
time spent disabled or in an unhealthy state. The prevalence of obesity among the 50+ is 
projected to increase from 28.1% in 2004 to 48% in 2050. As a result, the prevalence of 
diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease are also projected to increase. In 2050, 28.4% of 
Americans are projected to have diabetes and nearly two-thirds to have hypertension. 
As shown in Figure 5, our population forecast (last bar) for the age 65+ 
population in 2050 is very similar to that of the Social Security administration (80.3 vs. 
80.8 million) and much lower than Census projections (86.7), which assume larger 
reductions in mortality.  
Turning to economic outcomes, we project a decline in labor force participation 
among the 50+ (42.2% in 2050 compared to 48.7% in 2004).  For the most part, this is 
due to changing demographics in the U.S. population (more Hispanics and blacks, more 
female), which also explains the decline in average earnings.    16 
Government revenues are projected to increase from 2004 to 2050, primarily due 
to population growth. Government entitlement expenditures are also projected to increase 
substantially over the next 40 years. For example, Medicare costs are projected to be 
more than 2.5 times higher in 2050 than in 2004 ($731.9 billion in 2050) while OASI 
expenditures are projected to be three times higher ($1.304 trillion in 2050). Since all 
simulations are performed in 2004 dollars and do not make assumptions about inflation, 
growth and cost-of-living adjustments, it is difficult to compare these forecasts to other 
published estimates.  However, the real growth in costs more accurately reflects the size 
of these changes in terms of current purchasing power. 
Figure 6 compares our estimates of total costs in 2004 with other published 
sources. Revenues appear in the top panel against expenditures in the bottom panel. To 
estimate total taxes paid by age, we employ a two-step strategy. We first compute the 
total across all age groups from published sources. Using the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) of 2004, we then compute taxes paid using TAXSIM, and then compute the share 
of taxes paid by the age 50+. We use these two numbers to compute taxes paid for 2004 
among the 50+, which yields $307 billion. In the simulation, we censor incomes at 
$200k, due to the scarcity of observations above this threshold. According to the Tax 
Policy Center, those earning above 200k paid nearly 32% of all federal taxes in 2001. 
Hence, this gives a total tax paid by the age 50+ of $205.4 billion, which is within 5% of 
our estimate of $216.5 billion. Our estimate of Social Security payroll taxes is similarly 
close. 
For expenditures, the bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that we do a good job of 
matching total OASI benefits paid (we predict $417.2 billion compared to $408.5 billion 
from SSA publications), disability and SSI payments. For Medicare and Medicaid, we 
have adjusted payments so they match National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA).  
Overall, the model does a reasonable job matching data from administrative sources. 
Perhaps more importantly, the results from the baseline scenario make clear the rapidly 
increasing financial burden on a shrinking workforce. To isolate the role played by trends 
in health, we now look at a number of counterfactual scenarios.   17 
D.2.2  Obesity Scenario 
The obesity scenario rolls back the prevalence of obesity among 50 year-olds to its 1978 
level by 2030, where it remains until the end of the scenario, in 2050. As shown in Table 
4, this will decrease the prevalence of obesity among the age 50+ in 2050 from 48% to 
24.6%, nearly a 50% drop.   
We also simulate a decrease in the prevalence of associated health conditions. For 
example, the prevalence of diabetes drops from 28.4% in the baseline to 18.3%.   As a 
result, the size of the age 65+ population in 2050 is projected to be higher by roughly 2 
million. This is due to an increase in life expectancy as shown in Figure 7, which rises by 
2.2 years.  The increase in life-expectancy also brings about a decrease in the expected 
number of years living with a disability. These provide important health benefits to 
cohorts alive in these years. 
In 2050, the obesity reduction scenario implies 3.97% reduction in Medicare 
costs, due largely to the better health of the population. Medicaid savings are even larger, 
8.6%, due to the higher prevalence of obesity and smoking in the Medicaid population. 
On the other hand, OASI benefits increase by $28bn when we reduce obesity, because of 
the associated increase in longevity. This offsets nearly half of the Medicare/Medicaid 
savings. On the other hand, revenues increase slightly, in part due to longevity. Federal 
income tax revenue increases by 2.34% in 2050 or $5.9 billion. 
To grasp the importance of these differences, we computed the present value of 
the gains and losses for each group of expenditures from 2004-2050. We used a 3% real 
discount rate. We present these estimates in Figure 8. The present value of all Medicare 
and Medicaid savings under the obesity scenario are $199.5 billion and $166.1 billion 
respectively. In 2004, total retirement payroll tax paid by the population aged 50+ was 
$73.8 billion. This represents roughly five years’ worth of employee payroll tax 
contributions. The present value of future additional Social Security benefit outlays is 
$104.8 billion. The costs to Social Security are smaller than the benefits to Medicare in 
part because they occur farther in the future. As new, healthier (and lighter) cohorts enter 
the model, the disability reduction benefiting Medicare takes place before the increase in 
longevity that hurts Social Security.  On the revenue side, rolling back obesity leads to a 
boost of $59.3 billion (adding Federal tax, OASI and Medicare Tax). When added to the   18 
expenditure savings, the total net effect of obesity reduction on public finances is $340.9 
billion in savings.  Our analysis suggests that the health benefits of lower obesity occur 
earlier than the (public finance) costs of greater longevity.   
D.2.3  Smoking Scenario 
We now turn our attention to shifts in the prevalence of smoking. Under the 
baseline scenario, the prevalence of smoking (ever smoked and currently smoking) is 
projected to go down in the future. The “roll back” scenario gradually reduces the 
prevalence of smoking to its 1978 level, by 2030.  We assume that, in the future, entering 
cohorts of 50-54 year-olds will smoke more than today’s 50-54 year-olds. The extent of 
that change is shown in Figure  (bottom panel).  
Table 5 reports detailed results of this simulation. The size of the population age 
65+ in 2050 is 3.74 million smaller under this scenario. However, as shown in the table, 
this gain occurs mostly after 2030; the timing is driven by the long delayed effect of 
smoking on longevity. Inspecting Figure 9, life expectancy at age 50 is 2.45 years lower 
than under the baseline in 2050. This translates into cost savings for OASI but 
surprisingly also for Medicare and Medicaid. This is due to the reduction in the size of 
the elderly population, which offsets the other health effects. Greater mortality costs the 
government a 3.65% decline in Federal taxes, or $9.1 billion. Hence, while expenditures 
decrease, so do revenues.  
In Figure 10, we report the effect of the smoking scenario on the present value of 
various government expenditures. Apart from disability insurance, the effect is negative. 
For DI, the positive effect can be traced back to our transition model. The estimation of 
entrance into DI yielded modest positive effects for having cancer, lung disease and ever 
smoked. These in turn lead to higher take up of disability benefits. Hence, unlike the 
obesity scenarios, this scenario yields very modest effects on government expenditures 
but large effects on life expectancy. The longevity effect offsets to a large extent the 
increase in disability and health care costs. The total expenditure effect is $176.3 billion. 
On the revenue side, there is a large negative effect on revenues (-$118.3 billion). The 
bulk of this effect is on Federal tax revenue. Overall, the net public sector savings is $58 
billion which is much smaller than the net public sector effect of the obesity roll back   19 
scenario.  While smoking improvements have very different health consequences than 
obesity increases, they both increase public-sector financial liabilities.   
D.2.4  Comparison of Results to Existing Estimates 
Smoking 
To assess the plausibility of our results, we first compared our estimates of the 
difference in life expectancy for obese/non-obese and smokers/non-smokers with other 
published estimates. We used the 2004 cohort of respondents aged 51/52.  For 
comparison purposes, we do not condition on other characteristics that might differ 
across groups.  Table 6 demonstrates that 50 year-old current smokers had a remaining 
life expectancy of 25.8 years. Former smokers can expect to live 6.1 additional years, 
while those who never smoked can expect an additional 3.1 years. We compared those 
estimates with others in the literature (Rogers and Powell-Griner, 1991). For females 
(males), Rogers and Powell-Griner estimated that, compared to current smokers, former 
smokers could expect to live 3.7 (5.2) additional years and those who never smoked an 
additional 2.4 (1) years. Hence, the difference in life-expectancy between non-smokers 
and current smokers at age 50-54 ranged from 6.2 to 6.6 years.
7  Our estimated difference 
of 9.2 years is somewhat higher.  Particularly, we estimate larger mortality rate 
differences for older age groups.  
This difference can be best explained by mortality selection. Rogers and Powell-
Griner computed period life-tables, using current smoking status.  This compares 
unconditional mortality rates across surviving smokers and surviving non-smokers.  On 
the other hand, we condition on initial smoking status at age 50, and we used longitudinal 
data to model selection on observable characteristics.  When we computed unconditional 
                                                 
7 Sloan et al. (2004) estimate life tables for lifetime smokers, typical smokers and non-smokers 
using the HRS. Lifetime smokers are defined as smokers who are never predicted to quit while typical 
smokers are smokers who eventually quit at some age. Hence, Sloan et al.’s estimates are not directly 
comparable to ours. They estimate that a 50 year old male (female) lifetime smoker has 23 (27.7) remaining 
life years, a typical smoker 25.8 (29.9) years and a non-smoker 31.1 (33.6) years. Hence, the differences 
are of somewhat smaller than those we simulated. Furthermore, the authors consider the counterfactual in 
which existing smokers quit smokers (and vice-versa) while the comparison here is between non-smokers 
and smokers. When we turn smokers into non-smokers into our simulations, we get a 7.7 years 
improvement in life expectancy which is closer to the Sloan et al. estimates.   20 
mortality rates by current smoking status in the HRS – the approach most closely 
resembling Rogers and Powell-Griner -- we found the same magnitudes and patterns they 
did.  Those who continue to smoke after age 50 are likely to be more robust; this 
unobserved robustness may explain the compression of life expectancy between current 
smokers and current non-smokers. 
Obesity 
We estimate that an obese 50 year-old individual can expect to live 2.3 fewer 
years compared to a non-obese individual. There is much debate in the literature over the 
effect of obesity on life expectancy (Calle et al., 1999; Grabowski and Ellis, 2001; 
Peeters et al., 2003).  Studies focusing on young, middle-aged, or near-elderly 
populations tend to find obesity reduces longevity.  For instance, Peeters Barendregt et 
al., using data from the Framingham Heart Study, show that 40 year-old females non-
smokers lost 3.3 years (males lost 3.1 years) because of obesity. However, there is 
evidence that, among older age groups, obesity may be protective (Grabowski and Ellis, 
2001). However, when starting the comparison at age 70, mortality selection may be a 
problem.  The surviving obese and non-obese populations are likely to be differentially 
selected such that unobserved frailty confounds the relationship between obesity and 
future mortality. 
E.  Discussion 
In this paper, we exploit a health microsimulation model, outfitted with economic 
outcomes, to study the public finance consequences of trends in health.  It is well 
understood that better health leads to cost-savings for public health insurance, but greater 
liabilities for public annuities.  However, the timing and duration of mortality and 
morbidity changes are of crucial importance.  By definition, medical cost savings accrue 
earlier in life than increases in annuity burden.  This helps explain why the rising rate of 
obesity leads to greater public liabilities; a result that is aided further by the modest 
longevity reductions associated with obesity.  However, this tendency may not be enough 
if – as in the case of smoking reduction – the period of reduced morbidity is relatively 
short and close to the end of life.   21 
There is a popular perception that government programs benefit from worsened 
health.  This perception is typically formed from the case of smoking, in which longevity-
reductions do in fact benefit a number of government programs.  However, this intuition 
breaks down in a number of prominent and instructive examples.  For example, lowering 
obesity would save Medicare and Medicaid more than it would cost in terms of public 
annuity obligations.  Public health interventions in these areas, therefore, could produce 
very large gross returns for the public purse. 
From a positive point of view, trends in health among the young create something 
of a “perfect storm” for public spending.  While obesity growth and smoking reductions 
would appear to work at cross-purposes, they both add fuel to the growing public debt 
burden in the US.   We simulated the joint scenario, in which both obesity and smoking 
are rolled back to their 1978 levels and found this would shave $429.5 billion off public-
sector liabilities, from 2004 to 2050.
8  This is primarily due to lower public health care 
expenditure liabilities, which in turn is driven mostly by the morbidity effects of rising 
obesity.  The reduction in Social Security expenditures due to these combined trends is 
relatively small, around $17.5 billion.   
From the broadest possible perspective, the total additional liability of $429.5 
billion adds a bit less than 5% to the roughly $10.8 trillion (and rising) national debt 
currently outstanding.  While this is not trivial, it would be prima facie unrealistic to 
argue that trends in two health behaviors have played a dominant role in America’s 
current fiscal predicament.  More importantly, trends in obesity and smoking have placed 
further pressure on public health care programs straining under the weight of both 
demographics and medical technology.  For instance, annual Medicaid costs have spiked 
by more than 10% as a result of the combined trends in obesity and smoking, while 
annual Medicare costs have risen by 6.5%.  Moreover, the effects are also large relative 
to the size of the population treated.  Each newly obese individual will add $8,338 to 
Medicare over his lifetime (after age 50), while each fewer smoker adds $20,563.  At the 
margin, therefore, trends in public health involve relatively large stakes for public 
finances, and particularly for the Medicaid program. 
                                                 
8 The detailed results for this scenario appear in the appendix tables.   22 
To be clear, our study is not designed to calculate the total social welfare effects 
of changing public health trends, but rather to isolate the public finance effects, which are 
of independent interest to policymakers.  As such, we cannot justifiably advocate 
increases in smoking, or even reductions in obesity, upon the basis of these results alone.  
However, our work demonstrates that the public finance effects of these two major health 
trends are large enough to become part of the social welfare calculus for evaluating 
changes in these two health behaviors.    23 
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Source: National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS) 1997-2006, age 50+ population.   26 
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Source: NHANES and projections from existing studies. See Technical Appendix.  28 
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Figure 5 


















































Source: Census, SSA 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees and own Calculations for 
FEM.   30 
 
Figure 6 
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FEM-Baseline Official Source  
Notes:  The total federal individual income taxes in 2004 was $765 billion, according to Budget database (Table 2.1. 
RECEIPTS BY SOURCE: 1934–2009, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/sheets/hist02z1.xls); according to Current 
Population Survey, march supplement, 2005, the proportion of federal individual income taxes contributed by aged 51 and older was 
40%. As detailed in text, we adjusted this amount for taxes coming from incomes above 200k. The total employment contribution to 
OASDI trust fund in 2004 was $554 billion, according to 2005 OASDI Trustees Report; according to Current Population Survey, 
march supplement, 2005, the proportion of retirement payroll taxes paid by aged 51 and older was 28.3%. OASI includes benefits for: 
1) retired workers, 2) Spouses of retired workers, 3) Widow(er)s. It does not include benefits for: 1) Widowed mothers and fathers, 2) 
Parents of deceased workers; 3) Children of retired workers, 4) Children of deceased workers.   31 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
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Table 1  
Outcomes in the Transition Model 
Health SES & Other
Disease LFP & Benefit Status
heart disease working
hypertension DB pension receipt
stroke SS benefit receipt
lung disease DI benefit receipt
cancer Any Health insurance
diabetes ssi receipt
Risk factors Financial Resources
Smoking Status financial wealth
never smoked earnings
ever smoked wealth positive
current smoker









Notes: See Appendix for more details  
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Table 2  
Outcomes in the Model for New Cohorts 
Binary Censored Discrete
working for pay Any db plan
positive wealth Any dc plan
hypertension Censored Ordered
heart disease Early Age eligible DB
diabetes <52
any health insurance 52-57
SRH fair/poor 58>




















Notes: More detail in appendix.    38 
 
Table 3  
Baseline Projection of Health and Economic Outcomes for Age 50+ Population 2004-2050 
2004 2030 2050
Population size (Million) 80.71 121.91 144.00
Population 65+ (Million) 36.25 66.64 80.26
Prevalence of selected conditions
obesity (BMI >=30) (%) 28.1% 41.7% 48.0%
over weight (25<=BMI<30) (%) 38.1% 38.7% 36.4%
Ever-smoked 58.6% 49.6% 40.1%
Smoking now 16.9% 9.9% 6.8%
Diabetes 17.0% 24.9% 28.4%
Heart disease 23.0% 28.3% 29.9%
Hypertension 50.9% 61.2% 64.8%
Labor participation
Working (%) 48.7% 40.8% 42.2%
Average earnings if working ($) 42,858 37,167 37,189
Government revenues from aged 51+ (Billion $2004)
Federal personal income taxes 216.44 224.98 250.48
Social security payroll taxes 73.82 84.26 94.71
Medicare payroll taxes 18.67 20.33 22.85
Government expenditures from aged 51+ 
(Billion dollars)
Old Age and Survivors Insurance 
benefits (OASI) 417.15 1,022.04 1,304.03
Disability Insurance benefits (DI) 36.99 38.95 46.38
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 17.06 26.20 39.72
Medicare costs 290.24 550.73 731.94
Medicaid costs 118.72 154.36 234.04
dollars) 851.05 1,418.45 1,827.45
Year
Status Quo Estimates




Table 4  
Detailed Projections of Health and Economic Outcomes for Age 50+ 2004-2050: Obesity Scenario 
(Roll back to 1978 level by 2030) 
2030 2050 2030 2050
Population size (Million) 122.40 146.32 0.40% 1.61%
Population 65+ (Million) 66.98 82.32 0.50% 2.57%
Prevalence of selected conditions
obesity (BMI >=30) (%) 29.8% 24.6% -28.61% -48.71%
over weight (25<=BMI<30) (%) 40.6% 41.5% 4.70% 13.98%
Ever-smoked 49.7% 40.3% 0.15% 0.66%
Smoking now 10.2% 7.2% 3.33% 6.07%
Diabetes 20.0% 18.3% -19.57% -35.73%
Heart disease 27.6% 28.3% -2.20% -5.15%
Hypertension 57.3% 58.2% -6.39% -10.12%
Labor participation
Working (%) 41.0% 42.5% 0.42% 0.83%
Average earnings if working ($) 37,231 37,282 0.17% 0.25%
Government revenues from aged 51+ (Billion 
dollars)
Federal personal income taxes 227.4 256.3 1.08% 2.34%
Social security payroll taxes 85.1 96.5 0.96% 1.86%
Medicare payroll taxes 20.5 23.3 0.98% 1.91%
Total revenue 333.0 376.1 1.04% 2.19%
Government expenditures from aged 51+ 
(Billion dollars)
Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits 
(OASI) 1,025.3 1,332.3 0.32% 2.17%
Disability Insurance benefits (DI) 37.8 43.8 -3.03% -5.63%
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 26.0 39.3 -0.74% -1.06%
Medicare costs 538.7 702.9 -2.19% -3.97%
Medicaid costs 144.7 213.9 -6.29% -8.61%
Medicare + Medicaid 683.32 916.78 -3.09% -5.09%
Total medical costs for aged 51+ (Billion 
dollars) 1,380 1,748 -2.69% -4.34%
Notes: All dollars in 2004 values
Relative Obesity Roll-back
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Table 5   
Detailed Projections of Health and Economic Outcomes for Age 50+ 2004-2050: Smoking Scenario 
(Roll back to 1978 level by 2030) 
2030 2050 2030 2050
Population size (Million) 121.18 139.53 -0.60% -3.11%
Population 65+ (Million) 66.25 76.52 -0.58% -4.66%
Prevalence of selected conditions
obesity (BMI >=30) (%) 41.5% 47.8% -0.59% -0.37%
over weight (25<=BMI<30) (%) 38.8% 36.6% 0.25% 0.61%
Ever-smoked 61.9% 66.5% 24.72% 65.90%
Smoking now 16.6% 18.5% 67.21% 172.93%
Diabetes 25.0% 28.6% 0.38% 0.57%
Heart disease 28.4% 30.5% 0.61% 1.98%
Hypertension 61.2% 64.8% -0.05% -0.06%
Labor participation
Working (%) 40.5% 41.7% -0.89% -1.08%
Average earnings if working ($) 37,091 37,131 -0.21% -0.15%
Government revenues from aged 51+ 
(Billion dollars)
Federal personal income taxes 220.2 241.3 -2.14% -3.65%
Social security payroll taxes 82.6 91.4 -1.92% -3.46%
Medicare payroll taxes 19.9 22.1 -1.99% -3.49%
Total Revenue 322.7 354.8 -2.07% -3.59%
Government expenditures from aged 51+ 
(Billion dollars)
Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits 
(OASI) 1,020.3 1,258.9 -0.17% -3.46%
Disability Insurance benefits (DI) 43.0 52.1 10.30% 12.35%
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 26.2 39.0 0.15% -1.78%
Medicare costs 550.8 710.5 0.01% -2.92%
Medicaid costs 156.2 227.1 1.19% -2.95%
Total medical costs for aged 51+ (Billion 
dollars) 1,418.9 1,780.9 0.03% -2.55%
Notes: All dollars in 2004 values
Relative Smoking Scenario
   41 










% of cohort 38.80% 36.10% 25.10%
Life expectancy 35.0 31.9 25.8 33.6
Lifetime Medicare spending 84,002 76,231 63,439 85,042
Difference relative to normal weight
Additional life expectancy -3.1 -9.2 -7.7
% additional lifetime Medicare 
spending -9.3% -24.5% -25.4%
Normal-
weight Over-weight Obese
Obese turned into 
normal weight
% of cohort 28.50% 43.20% 28.30%
Life expectancy 33.0 31.4 30.6 32.4
Lifetime Medicare spending 72,399 75,579 80,737 74,473
Difference relative to non-smoker
Additional life expectancy -1.6 -2.3 -0.6
% additional lifetime Medicare 
spending 4.4% 11.5% 2.9%
Notes: 2004 dollars. 
Obesity
Smoking
 